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To many academic observers the European Monetary System is a somewhat
mysterious animal. It cannot be classified as a fixed rate regime since it
has allowed much more flexibility than the Bretton Woods system. It is
even less a floating rate regime since it is based on the commitment of
member countries to defend agreed parities. The effects and consequences
of the EMS are also difficult to define precisely. If skepticism was the
prevailing attitude five years ago, surprise at what is often recognized as
the 'success' of the System is the attitude today.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the significance and performance
of the EMS by drawing on the author's involvement with economic
policy-making rather than economic analysis. While the two professions
of economic policy making and economic analysis have much in common,
since they deal essentially with the same problems, important differences
in perspectives, objectives and tools make the dialogue between them
difficult at times. Factors which are central to policy making seem difficult
to incorporate into rigorous analysis, to the point that academic economists
sometimes prefer to ignore them altogether. Policy makers, on the other
hand, are hard pressed to catch the relevant messages generated by
increasingly sophisticated techniques of formal analysis.
Most of the academic literature on exchange rate relationships in the
last ten years or so has, perhaps not surprisingly, usually concluded that
better results can be obtained if the exchange rate is allowed to move, or
at least if a fixed rate constraint can be switched on and off at will. The
policy maker, however, emerges with the disturbing feeling that this fails
to capture the essence of a system like the EMS. To him the basic reason
for adopting such a system is the structural change it brings in the interplay
between the exchange rate and other areas of policy. After the adoption
of a system like the EMS, the policy-making structure of a group of inter-
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dependent countries is not simply the previous one plus an exchange rate
constraint —itis a new structure, in which policy behaviour, the ranking in
of objectives, and the procedures for coordination between sovereign
countries are profoundly affected by the new regime, although they have
not been formally reformed.
The policy maker is well aware of the limits of his analysis and will want di
to check his conclusions with those obtained by professional economists.
However, he is only likely to accept the results of this check if it in
incorporates the elements he deems essential or if it convincingly argues
that they are of negligible importance. tc
This paper presents three aspects of the European Monetary System. It m
first discusses (Section II) systemic issues which in the view of the author
are at the heart of the policy process of multicountry economies, that is th
economies that embrace several sovereign countries. It is argued that at
the crucial question in the process of policy cooperation is to combine the
necessary degree of discretion with the need to take action at the in
multicountry rather than at the individual country level. The members of cc
a multicountry economy are unlikely to opt for a cooperative game unless Cc
an appropriate institutional framework is established. The collapse of the
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system can be explained in the light ) 01
of the double alternative 'rules versus discretion' and 'ad hoc versus ar
institutionalized cooperation'. The European Monetary System can be wi
seen as an example of a more successful solution of this double alternative. rn
Section III presents quantitative evidence concerning the ability of the re
System to achieve some of the objectives that were set for it at the of
beginning. This evidence covers four topics; variability of nominal exchange
rates; dollar policy; coordination of monetary policy; and 'real' conver- re
gence. Statistical evidence, however, is only one of the tools that need to tb
be used for a thorough assessment of the EMS. Section IV presents some th
of the 'non-quantitative' elements that throw light of the working of the Sy
System. This shows how the System has combined the necessary degree 01
of discretion with the implementation of institutionalized cooperation.
is
II Systemic issues ar
Rules versus discretion a
In the last fifteen years the conduct of macroeconomic policy has a
moved in opposite directions in the international and domestic spheres.
Domestically, there has been a movement towards greater reliance on rules,
as can be seen in the adoption of quantitative targeting and the abandonment JUC
of fine tuning in monetary policy, and in the proposals in several countries
for constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget. disPolicy cooperation and the EMS experience 333
By contrast, there has been a major shift from rules to discretion in the
i e international sphere, and in the conduct of exchange rate policy in
ng particular. In the early seventies the increasing rigidity of the Bretton
Woods system combined with the influence of academic thinking induced
policy makers to adopt floating exchange rates in an attempt to free
Lnt domestic policy from the external constraint. Major countries failed to
ts agree on an alternative set of rules or guidelines for the management of
international monetary relationships. In particular, no rules were estab-
lished for intervening in the foreign exchange markets and the only check
to purely discretionary action by individual governments was the judge-
mental surveillance of the IMF.
ior There are several factors at work in these contrasting developments. At
•is the national level stronger rules have been seen as a way of shielding policy
at authorities from the pressures of political constituencies. In addition, in the
he early l970s the domestic sphere was marked by greater discretion than the
the international one.Finally, the complexity of economic interactions
of combined with the degree of integration that had developed among
ess countries, contributed to the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate rule.
:he In general, discretion should be exerted whenever there are conflicting
'ht objectives, while fixed rules are preferable when conflicts between objectives
• are only apparent, or when the costs —interms of uncertainty —associated
be with greater discretion exceed the benefits deriving from improved achieve-
ye. ment of final objectives. This general principle underlies the various
:he reasons for the movement towards greater discretion in the management
he of the world economy.
ge The nature of the present exchange rate system is the first of these
reasons. A return to a fixed parity system is at present inconceivable, but
to •the rule of pure floating has also been severely criticized. What lies between
ne these extremes, however, is the discretionary management of a floating
he system by policy-oriented, institutions that interact with private profit-
ee oriented agents.
A second reason is the increased complexity of coordinating the
macroeconomic policies of a group of sovereign countries. This, in turn,
is due to the emergence of several centers of economic power, all of which
are on a par and tied together by highly integrated financial markets under
a system of floating exchange rates that appears to reinforce rather than
as attenuate the transmission of disturbances. In these circumstances,
cooperation requires coordinated action involving a wide range of
instruments and policies, something that can only be achieved through
nt judgemental decisions.
es A third reason is the increasing frequency of exogenous shocks and
disturbances, such as oil embargos, economic sanctions and sudden334 Tommaso Padoa Schioppa
financial crises, that require many countries to respond consistently and ai
effectively.
Finally, discretion may be necessary to avoid the 'moral hazard' ol
created by knowledge of government behavioural rules. A case in point
is the function of lender of last resort, which should operate without a
predetermined set of rules in order to discourage excessive risk-taking by o
private agents; another, with an adjustable peg system, is the need to avoid
setting rules for currency realignment in order to avoid speculation.
In conclusion, an increasingly complex and integrated world requires di
that discretionary decisions should play a greater role in the solution of F
multicountry cooperation problems. This does not imply a loosening of b:
the government function at either the global or the national level. Firstly, lo
in some cases discretion should actually replace rules, but more generally
it should be complementary to existing rules. Moreover, discretion should si
be implemented in order to increase the area of government's responsibilities e,




Discretion needs to be increased, but it should be exercised jointly pi
by the agents operating in the international sphere so that action is taken
at the system level. This raises the question of the role institutions should in
play in the management of multicountry economies. C
A crucial distinction must be drawn between 'institutionalized' and p]
'ad-hoc' cooperation. in
Ad hoc cooperation is based on discussions among the interested parties,
but joint action is taken only if agreement is reached. In the last ten years Ci
thistype of cooperation has prevailed and in many cases —probablythe o
majority —nocommon action was taken as a result of failure to reach di
agreement. There was therefore a usually uncoordinated response at the ti
level of individual countries.
Institutionalized cooperation, by contrast, ensures that decisions and dii
actions are taken at the multicountry level even when the parties fail to cd
agree; therefore institutional responsiveness is more permanent and more dl
certain in character. Within an institution the need for action to achieve
public goals is established 'a priori', whereas with the cooperative
approach this need has to be established each time. For institutionalized )
cooperation to work effectively, some national powers must be transferred of
to the supra-national sphere. However, this does not necessarily imply a a
reduction in national governments' control nor an increase in overall
public intervention in the economic sphere; on the contrary, it makes it di
possible to regain control over phenomena that would otherwise escape cxPolicy cooperation and the EMS experience 335
nd any form of management and possibly to avoid the distortive actions often
taken at the national level in an attempt to reconcile conflicting domestic
rd' objectives.
mt The difference in the nature of the two approaches indicates several
t a reasons why improving multicountry coordination requires a strengthening
by of institutions.
oid First of all, even when cooperative methods work at their best, they are
generally too slow, a feature that conflicts with the increasing need for
res discretionary decisions in the management of a multicountry economy.
of Failure to produce timely responses may even exacerbate existing problems
of by inducing action at the lower, national, level and thus causing welfare
losses and unnecessary friction.
• A second reason is that cooperative methods rarely work at their best
uld since they are subject to greater constraints associated with the pressure
ties exerted by local constituencies and public opinion on the officials and
ted politicians who run the cooperative process. Especially in periods of
• recession it is not unusual for the electorate to be more prone to selfish
and inward looking measures than either Ministers or officials. Thus ad
hoc cooperation is less ready to compromise or to give general goals
itly priority over particular interests.
•ken A third reason is that political instability in the l970s considerably
uld increased the turnover of governments and officials in many countries.
Consequently negotiators did not have time to the learning
tnd process or develop the personal relationships and good-will that are
indispensable to the success of ad hoc cooperation.
ies, Fourth, the growth in the number of negotiating parties makes the
ars cooperative process exceedingly difficult. Consensus becomes harder to
the obtain, and even if decisions were taken by a select group, it might be
ich difficult to implement them or have them accepted by those excluded from
the the negotiations.
Fifth, the growing complexity of the information base leads to a
nd dilemma that is well known to those who have been involved in international
to cooperation. Officials with a broader perspective and the authority to make
ore decisions often fail to master the many intricacies of the problems: they
'see the forest but fail to see the trees'. By contrast, those who master the
ive details, often do not appropriately perceive the relevant priorities or the
correct perspective of the issues and tend to consider relatively small points
red of controversy as sufficient reason for delaying or even preventing
y a • agreements.
Finally, an increasing number of problems are at the intersections of
s it different domains: exchange rates and trade, trade and financial markets,
spe exchange rates and EC common agricultural policy etc. The interdisci-
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plinary approach required to tackle such problems effectively is at odds
with the highly specialized nature of the existing fora. This information 11
base dilemma makes 'package deals' very difficult to achieve. Corn
regal
The basic proposition tiona
To improve the management of multicountry economies will
require coordinated steps to increase the role of discretionary decisions and and
strengthen the institutional framework. The basic proposition then reads: 1978
the scope for discretionary decisions in the government of multicountry monl
economies will have to be greater than in the 1950s and 1960s but stabj
international institutions will have to be strengthened if such decisions are diffet
to be taken at the appropriate level. volat
The experience of the last 15 years in the field of international monetary third
relationships, among large currencies and at the European level respectively, in th
clarify the importance of this basic proposition. A brief reference is made the
in this section to the international monetary system while the two that TI
follow focus on the EMS. with i
In the pre-1971 monetary world the emphasis was on rules: exchange
rates were fixed and parity change, a discretionary decision almost by do w
definition, was considered an exception to be avoided whenever possible. the F
Moreover, discretion tended to be exercised at the national rather than at beha
the international level, since parity changes were essentially unilateral hypo
decisions. It can be argued that the Bretton Woods system would have in a
functioned more efficiently, and perhaps lasted longer, if the right to make to Id
parity changes had been exercised in a more timely and multilateral corn
fashion. The combination of a weak institutional framework for the parti
discretionary part of the system, and the bias in favour of exchange rate elTec
rigidity contributed to the final collapse. (ii) d
Under the floating exchange rate regime introduced in 1973 monetary how
and trade relationships have again suffered from persistent misalignments appr
of real exchange rates, thus reproducing the negative features of the the
previous regime. The rule of fixed parities has been replaced by the rule
of exchange rate variability, but the object of discretion, the 'disciplinary appr4
element', has again been confined to unilateral decisions. Viewed in the
light of the two issues of' rules versus discretion' and 'institutional versus
ad hoc cooperation' the two systems are very much alike: 'in both cases
what was missing was the exercise of the required discretion, and this was
due, in both cases, to a fundamental weakness of the institution which
should have practiced this discretionality' (Padoa Schioppa 1983). carri
We turn now to the case of monetary cooperation in Europe. the
cont
for
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odds iii The EMS: quantitative evidence
"ion
Compared to the developments at the international level, the EMS can be
regarded, five years after its creation, as a successful example of institu-
tionalized cooperation. The objectives of the System —asdefined in the
will Bremen Annex to the conclusions of the European Council of July 1978
and and in the Brussels Resolution of the European Council of December
1978 —canbe summed up in two points. First, to create a 'zone of
intry monetary stability in Europe', to be understood as 'internal and external
but stability'. This meant a reduction in the overall inflation level and in the
s are differentials between member countries, coupled with more stable and less
volatile exchange rates. Second, 'to coordinate members' policies vis-à-vis
etary third countries', i.e. to increase the cohesiveness of European currencies
vely, in the face of dollar instability and to offer a 'European' instrument to
nade the growing reserve currency status of the mark.
that The best way to assess the EMS performance would be to compare it
• with the estimated development of monetary conditions in member
•ange countries in its absence. Such an analysis, however, is impossible. Not only
;t by do we lack a sufficiently complete model to simulate a non-EMS path of
- the European economies in the 1979—84 period; but our knowledge of the
•an at behaviour of policy makers is too anecdotal to construct a realistic
•teral hypothesis of the interactions between economic events and policy decisions
•have in a non-EMS environment over the last five years.. Thus we have chosen
nake to identify four key elements on the basis of the above objectives and to
•teral compare their behaviour beforeand after theinception of the EMS in
the participating and non-participating countries in an attempt to identify the
rate effects of the System. The four elements are: (i) nominal exchange rates;
(ii) dollar policy; (iii) monetary policy; (iv) 'real' convergence. It is clear,
however, that the methodology we propose would be equivalent to the
tents appropriate method, only if the EMS was the unique innovation between
the the two periods; although this assumption is unwarranted in principle, in
rule practice the EMS was such a major change that our exercise is a good
nary approximation of the one comparing an EMS versus a non-EMS world.
tthe
rsus Nominal exchange rates
ases We shall start by evaluating the impact of the System in terms of
was exchange rate stability.
hich Empirical studies on the effect of the EMS on exchange rates have been
carried out at the Commission of the EC and the IMF. The analysis of
the Commission' utilizes general standard indicators of variability. This
contribution is useful for the large number of currencies considered and
for the emphasis given to the variability of the mark with respect to EMS
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and non-EMS currencies. The overall conclusion is that 'the System has
made a positive contribution to exchange rate stability'.
The IMF official position can be found in the 1983 Annual Report which
states that' ...theEMS has not yet achieved its intended goal of fostering
the emergence of a zone of greater monetary stability in Europe. In fact,
the cumulative changes in nominal exchange rates that have taken place
over the past four years have been larger than those during the previous
four years'. However an IMF analysis of the EMS performance2 concludes
with regard to variability that '...it appears that the exchange rate
variability of the EMS currencies has diminished since the introduction of
the System...'
Compared with these studies, the original contribution of this section
lies in the express consideration given to separate measures of total
variability and variability around trend, and in the use of daily observations
for the entire period of floating and for all the effective exchange rates
considered. As will be shown, this provides strong evidence that in the first
five EMS years member currencies behaved in a way that was substantially
both from that of the same currencies in previous years, and from
that of non-EMS currencies throughout the 1973—84 period.
Recent academic literature on exchange rate variability has not analysed
the EMS, but rather the dollar and other reserve currencies. To do this,
it has used several measures, suëh as averages of absolute changes,
standard deviations and deviations from long-term trends.3 As Kenen
(1979) has demonstrated, most measures show the same basic patterns over
time and across countries. Three such standard indicators have been used
here: MAP, which measures total movements of the exchange rate along
trend as well as around trend ;4VEER,which measures movements around
trend;5 EV, defined as the weighted average of standard deviations of
bilateral exchange rate percentage changes.°
Considering nominal exchange rate behaviour these three measures have
been applied to monthly and daily data of two sets of three respectively
non-EMS and EMS currencies. The non-EMS currencies considered were
the dollar, the yen and the pound sterling, which does not participate in
the European exchange rate agreement; the EMS ones were the Deutsche
mark, the French franc and the lira. These are the three 'major' EMS
currencies and those which had been unable to stay together for long in
the previous 'snake' arrangements. The DM represents the lower inflation
currencies in the System as well as the group of 'minor' currencies that
belonged to the 'snake'; the lira and the French franc, the higher inflation
ones.
Comparison of the chosen indicators before and after the inception of
the System (Table 8.1) shows that total (MAP) and around trend (EV,
-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VEER) variability of the three EMS currencies fell substantially both on
a monthly and on a daily basis. The variability of the DM, the lira and
the French franc against the aggregate of the EMS currencies also
decreased. By contrast, the variability of the non-EMS currencies increased
in every case except for a (negligible) fall in the monthly MAP measure
for the pound sterling.
When the currencies inside and outside the System are compared, all
three measures of daily and monthly variability indicate that the three
currencies belonging to the European exchange agreement were more
stable than the freely floating currencies during the EMS period. Moreover,
some of these currencies had shown greater variability than the dollar and
the pound sterling in the pre-EMS period of floating, thus confirming that
participation increased their exchange rate stability.
In summary, the variability of the EMS currencies in the EMS years was
significantly less than in previous years and approximately half that 4
recordedby non-EMS currencies.
Dollar policy
The need for, and lack of, a 'common dollar policy' has been and
still is one of the main sources of controversy and complaint about the
EMS. Undeniably, the aim of the System 'to coordinate members' policies
vis-à-vis third countries' is difficult to formulate both conceptually and (
operationally.
. d
It might be argued that a bloc of currencies tied together by fixed parities
and floating vis-à-vis the outside should not require any such coordination.
In the EMS, however, one of these currencies has a special position in two
respects: first, it is the only one that plays the role of an international
reserve currency and, second, having a superior price performance, it
normally tends to appreciate within the System. The impact on the DM
of dollar movements is thus generally greater than the DM's share of the
ECU, so that the German currency tends to rise or fall vis-à-vis EMS
currencies when it rises or falls vis-à-vis the dollar.
In this situation, and given that the floating of the EMS bloc vis-à-vis
the outside is managed, coordination may range from an attempt to avoid e
inconsistent actions and objectives to a search for an 'optimum' c
ECU/dollar exchange rate. This would presumably correspond to an
agreed-upon combination of the objective of minimizing intra-EMS
tensions with other objectives, such as price stability and employment.
In reality what has emerged as a 'common dollar policy', is more a d
coordination of other member countries' monetary policy with that of h
Germany, which, in turn, has increasingly become the monetary 'center
of gravity' of the EMS (Micossi and Padoa Schioppa (1984)). Hence, the
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n Table 8.2. Correlation coefficient of D. mark exchange rate changes'
d
0 Before EMS2After EMS'
S/DM, EMS/DM4 0.61 (0.57) 0.36 (0.47)
,,HFL/DM 0.32 (0.32) 0.26 (0.13)
•
,,LIT/DM 0.59 (0.50) 0.50 (0.57) .
,,FF/DM 0.44 (0.42) 0.16 (0.42)
,,BF/DM 0.36(0.41) 0.20(0.13)
,,DK/DM 0.43 (0.46) 0.31 (0.26)
,,IRP/DM 0.68 (0.63) 0.22 (0.44)
1 Based on weekly average observations. Numbers in parenthesis are correlation
coefficients of exchange rate changes during periods of dollar depreciation.
2 March '73—March '79.
March '79—March '84.
lEffective exchange rate of the DM vis-à-vis the EMS currencies excluding pound
sterling.
fact that the exchange rate, especially vis-à-vis the DM, has become a key
indicator of national monetary conditions and of their consistency within
the System, in conjunction with the increased attractiveness of the DM in
international portfolios as a substitute for the dollar, implies that
Germany's monetary policy has also come to play a significant role in
determining the external value of the EMS currencies.
In conclusion, to the extent that the EMS has added to the attractiveness
of the DM by making it the reference standard of a large and increasingly
'harmonized' area and that the exchange rate agreement has forced
countries to adopt domestic policies consistent with Germany's monetary
developments it can be argued that the System has been able to implement
a common policy vis-à-vis third currencies.
In practice, movements in the dollar/mark exchange rate have still been
matched by movements in the DM against the EMS currencies, but at least
the frequency of such simultaneous movements has been reduced. In
Table 8.2 we report the correlation coefficients of the dollar/mark
exchange rate against the mark's exchange rate in terms of all the EMS
currencies. In the EMS period the correlation with the dollar has decreased,
which constitutes indirect evidence of the ability of the System to shield the
DM rates of other EMS currencies from dollar movements. The same
correlation coefficients calculated for the periods in which the dollar was
depreciating and in which strains within the EMS tended to be greater,
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Table 8.3. Moneygrowth rates in the EMScountries*














Average 12.4 9.0 1.4 — 1.5






Standard Deviation8.9 6.8 8.7 5.8
1 From73.11 to 79.1.
From 79.1! to 83.111.
Deflated by consumer price changes.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
*Aggregatesrefer to the 9 EMS countries.
Monetary policy
At the inception of the System it was feared that the constraint
imposed by a fixed rate regime would undermine countries' ability to
pursue domestic monetary targets in their anti-inflationary strategies. The
evidence, however, suggests that the EMS has not prevented a general
slowdown in the growth of monetary aggregates. Today nobody, in any
EMS country, seriously claims that the System has encouraged inflationary
policies.
Analysis of member countries' monetary aggregates before and after the
creation of the EMS shows a significant drop in growth rates compared
with the years of floating rates. The growth rates ofMl and M2 have fallen
from 12.4 and 15.2 per cent to 9.0 and 12.6 per cent respectively, with an
even greater slowdown in 'real' M Iand M2 growth. Furthermore,
dispersion around average, as measured by standard deviation, has also
been reduced (Table 8.3).
Indirect evidence on the degree of monetary policy coordination is
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Nominalas well as real interest rates have shown a marked increase in
correlation among the EMS countries (Table 8.5). In part this can be
attributed to the response to interest rate developments in the United States
(IMF (1983)) but italso reflects the need to equalize interest rate
developments among member countries in order to maintain exchange rate
stability. It should be noted that correlation has increased more among
long-term than short-term rates, especially for real rates. This development
reflects the need, with a system of limited floating exchange rates, to manage
short-term interest rates with the aim of influencing capital flows and
correcting for fundamental disequilibria in exchange rates. This applies
particularly to Italy's and France's real short-term rate movements vis-à-vis
Germany's and is consistent with the changes in their relative prices and
exchange rates. Indirect evidence of the leading role played by Germany's
monetary policy can be deteced in the fact that the correlation of its interest
rates with all the countries considered has increased during the EMS period
in almost all cases.
Nominal money growth rates provide only scanty evidence of increased
correlation after March 1979. But if one looks at real money aggregates
often considered a more reliable indicator of the 'tightness' of monetary
policy, a stronger correlation can be detected, especially for Ml.
Finally, it can be noted that since the start of the EMS the number of
cases in which the correlation has increased for UK monetary aggregates
is smaller than for other countries; the fact t.hat sterling does not
participate in the exchange rate agreement may partly explain such
difference.
'Real convergence'
The most radical criticisms heard in 1978 and 1979 against the
EMS can be summarized as follows: 'The System cannot by itself enforce
convergence of costs and prices. The artificial exchange rate stabilization
of widely diverging currencies will generate increasing misalignments of
real exchange rates, trade distortions and protectionist pressures. Worse,
it may force stable members to inflate. If, on the other hand, high inflation
countries were to adopt a more stability oriented policy, the fruits of it
could be reaped even without the EMS'.
Preliminary quantitative evidence on some of the relevant variables
suggests that the System has indeed been less than successful in taming
inflation, but that the too pessimistic expectations have not been borne out.
As regards real exchange rates (Table 8.6a), monthly observations show
all the EMS currencies, as well as the pound sterling, as having reduced
their total (MAP) variability since March 1979, while the dollar and the yen
recorded increases. This development seems to indicate that, in spite of346 Tommaso Padoa Schioppa
Table 8.6a. Real exchange rate variability1
Monthly observations .
MAP2 VEER3
Before After Before After
EMS4 EMS1 EMS4 EMS5
Non-EMS currencies
Against major currencies6
US Dollar 1.00 1.60 1.32 1.98
Yen 1.58 2.01 2.07 2.67
Pound sterling 1.78 1.61 1.69 2.12
EMS currencies
Against major currencies6
D. Mark 1.01 0.69 1.45 0.86
Lira 1.23 0.62 1.90 0.83
F. Franc 0.97 0.83 1.30 1.09
Against EMS currencies
D. Mark 1.02 0.54 1.42 0.75
Lira 1.38 0.60 2.04 0.82
F. Franc 1.04 0.80 1.38 1.08
1Real exchange rates are calculated on the basis of wholesale prices.
2 Mean of absolute percentage changes.
Standard deviations of percentage changes.
March 73—March 79.
March 79—December 83.
6 Major 14 currencies.
fixed parities and inflation differentials, exchange rates have been allowed
to move enough to avoid excessive changes in relative competitiveness.
Moreover, the changes have tended to foster internal adjustment, in the
sense that weak currencies have shown an appreciating real exchange rate
and thus a loss of competitiveness. Variability around trend (VEER) has
been reduced during the EMS period for the mark, the lira and the French
franc.
In terms of price stability the EMS can only claim some modest results.
This is presumably due to the fact that the inception of the System was
followed by the second oil shock and the rapid rise of the dollar, two
external factors which caused inflation rates to accelerate and diverge in
Europe. anc
Consumer price inflation during, the five EMS years did not come down
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8.2 Consumer price inflation rates in the EMS countries
the average inflation rate of the member countries was reduced (Figure 8.1
and Table 8.6b). In the first two years of the EMS inflation rates rose and
the differentials between member countries widened. This was partly due
to the above mentioned external factors but also to the fact that France,
Ireland and Italy had joined the System with depreciated real exchange
Policy cooperation and the EMS experience 347
Italy



















FRG 4.9 5.0 4.8
U.K. 15.1 16.6 8.1
FR 10.3 12.4 11.4
IT 15.7 18.7 16.0
Average EMS5 11.0 [1.5 9.8
Standard Deviation 5.1 5.6 4.8
From 73.11 to 79.1.
2 From 79.11 to 84.1.
From 79.11 to 80.IV.
From 81.1 to 84.1.
' AllEMS countries.
Table 8.6c. Correlation betweeninflation rates and betweenindustrial
activity in the EMS countries
FRG IT UK
beforeafter beforeafter beforeafter •
CountriesEMS'EMS'EMS'EMS2EMS'EMS'
inflation rates3
FR 0.35 0.85 0.73 0.71 0.47 0.71
FRG — — 0.15 0.65 0.34 0.61
IT — — — 0.46 0.73
industrial activity4
FR 0.91 0.85 0.94 0.61 0.64 0.60
FRG — — 0.82 0.66 0.71 0.52
IT — — — — 0.54 0.05
Correlation before the EMS: March 1973—March 1979.
Correlation after the EMS: April 1979—March 1984 (inflation rates), Dec. 1983
(industrial activity).
Consumer price inflation rates.
Growth rates of industrial production.
Table 8.6b. Consumer price changes in the EMS rai
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rates that allowed inflation rates to diverge before the exchange rate
constraint made itself felt.
Starting in 1980 the disciplinary effects began to exert pressure, the
average inflation rate fell and the divergence of inflation rates was slowly
reduced. Although the two oil shocks had a very similar effect on industrial
countries, it seems that the inflationary impact was parried better by the
EMS countries in the second case. After the first oil price increase, inflation
rose on average from 9 per cent in the third quarter of 1973 to a maximum
of almost 16 per cent at the end of 1974, while in 1980 it peaked at about
13.5 per cent. On the contrary, in most of the remaining industrial countries
including Canada and the US, inflation after the second oil shock peaked
at a higher level than after the first. Finally, an improvement can be
claimed by the System in terms of a uniform pattern of inflation rates as
revealed by bilateral correlation coefficients (Table 8.6c). These increased
significantly in every case, except one.
As for the EMS effects on economic activity, results are mixed. The
aggregate growth rate of industrial production in the EMS fell considerably
in the EMS period; the cross-border standard deviation of these growth
rates also decreased pointing to greater convergence of economic activity.
By contrast, coordination seems to have decreased as indicated by the fall
in the bilateral correlation coefficients among the major EMS countries
(Table 8.6c).
IV The system at work
Early criticisms
In early 1978 the decision to set up the EMS was viewed with
skepticism by many market operators, economists and experts, and even
by some officials.
It was considered another invention of politicians, rather than a serious
remedy for the shortcomings of the existing situation. At best the potential
benefits were minimized and seen as limited to fostering intra-EEC trade,
while intervention in the foreign exchange market was considered useless
or even harmful.
Several arguments were used to support this attitude of skepticism. It
was said that a fixed exchange rate regime would undermine national
983 monetary targets; defense of the parity would cause strong currency
countries' domestic targets to be overshot and produce an unacceptable
inflationary bias. It was argued that real exchange rate movements would
be amplified by nominal exchange rate rigidity and stubborn defense of
agreed parities, thus increasing protectionist pressures. It was claimed that
the asymmetry of the burden of adjustment would soon force weak350 TommasoPadoa Schioppa
currencies to abandon the exchange rate arrangements. It was also thought
that the enlarged credit facilities —akey element of the System —would ret
create a 'moral hazard' and allow diverging countries to postpone
adjustment. Finally, it was suggested that the need to sustain exchange rate
parities in the face of massive speculation would prove a serious threat to a t
the stock of official reserves.
Even after five years of experience with the System the validity of these sc
criticisms cannot be definitely upheld or refuted by quantitative analysis
alone. An element of judgement, based on a priori arguments and a pr
subjective reading of events, is still necessary. As we said earlier, we believe ch
that the System has had a significant influence on the formulation of policy wi
objectives, particularly in certain countries and at certain critical junctures, foi
and that it has modified the nature of the 'cooperative game' between
member countries in areas that go well beyond exchange rates.
To support this view, a careful examination of the actual working of de
the System at both the Community and the national levels would be pa
necessary. Policy decisions, their choronology and their determinants me
would have to be assessed to detect the role played by the EMS. Since such
an analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper, we shall only present of
some anectodal evidence of the way the System has actually worked, drawn fro
largely from direct personal experience. N
lin
Institutional aspects in'
To understand the way the System has actually functioned, it is Cc
not enough to read the written provisions. It is also necessary to consider ap
the practices and interpretations that have gradually been established in
five years of sometimes turbulent operation. This has generated new, dc
unwritten rules, that are now just as important as the original written ones.
Some of them regard the fundamental, constitutional aspects of the
System; others its management. Taken together they have made the en
European Monetary System differ from the Bretton Woods regime much
more than most observers, and perhaps also the founders, originally
expected. pr
In the first place, central rates have been realigned in a much more timely SU
and pragmatic way than ever occurred under the Bretton Woods Spi
arrangements. The contradiction inherent in the expression 'adjustable th
peg' has been resolved in a fairly balanced way. Over-protracted defense ab1
of parities has not been a feature of the System. On some occasions
realignments were delayed, thus giving ground to speculation, but the delay In
was never too long, and generally allowed conditions favourable to the ch
adoption of adjustment measures to mature. The experience of the 'snake' be
has been very important in this respect, since it showed that an adjustable of
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ht peg system could be managed with a fair amount of flexibility and still
uld retain credibility.
The second and, we believe, the most important aspect of constitutional
practice, is that the setting of new central rates in the EMS has become
to a truly collective decision. The importance of this cannot be stressed too
much. A basic aim of a system like the EMS is precisely to eliminate the
ese scope for obtaining trade advantages by unilateral exchange rate
management. The past offers significant previous experiences of this
a process of collective decisions. Under the Bretton Woods System the rare
eve changes in central rates were basically decided by the interested country,
licy while the role of the other countries and the IMF was virtually limited to
—res formal ratification. In the 'snake', the leadership of Germany was so strong
eer that there was little room left for bargaining.
Realignments in the EMS have only gradually become collective
of decisions. The first,in September 1979, largely repeated the 'snake'
be pattern: one country, Germany, took the initiative of calling a ministerial
tnts meeting, at which it presented a complete set of new rates. It was then
uch realized that this method could not work a second time, as the number
ent of parties around the table and their relative importance were very different
from those of the 'snake'. The following two realignments (Denmark,
November 1979, and Italy, March 1981) were essentially unilateral, and
limited to exchange rates: no meeting was called, only one currency was
involved and no policy measures were presented and discussed, the
is Community procedures were limited to giving a sort of 'multilateral
icr approval' to the decision taken by one member. After these three
in realignments the procedure has become one of collective decision, much
closer to those of he other Community areas, such as trade and agriculture,
es. than to those of monetary cooperation. The actual outcome of realignment
the sessions rarely met the requests of member countries in full; countries often
:he emerged from negotiations with a somewhat different grid of parities from
ch . theone they were seeking at the start.
Ily The third institutional aspect of the System that has been shaped by
practice is that changes in parities have coincided with the adoption of
substantial policy measures. This, of course, had always been part of the
'ds spirit of an adjustable peg system, and had been stressed many times by
1e theorists. However, experience justified a certain degree of skepticism
ise about the ability of member countries to follow this line. And indeed, as
ns we have recalled, the first realignments were not satisfactory in this respect.
ay Increasingly, however, changes in parities have been part of major policy
he changes, which has also meant that policies of domestic adjustment have
been increasingly discussed in Community fora as a result of the working
,le of the EMS.352 Tommaso Padoa Schioppa
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Functional aspects rek
These three features are 'constitutional' aspects of the System, and ins
they distinguishitsharply from the Bretton Woods approach to
multicountry cooperation. Their nature is best clarified in terms of the
systemic issues analyzed in Section II above. The System has succeeded
in coupling the appropriate degree of discretion with the appropriate level
of decision making. It has achieved a form of institutionalized cooperation Th
unknown with earlier regimes. req
Other aspects of the experience of the last five years, do not belong to m
the 'unwritten constitution', but rather to the operation of the System. stri
Nevertheless they help explain how this has actually worked and what its
achievements have been.
Many observers have noted that, contrary to world exchange rates (the
dollar, the yen, the Deutsche mark), EMS exchange rates have always
moved 'in the right direction', which is in itself a positive result, from the mo
point of view of what could be termed the 'trade objective' of the System: I
i.e. to keep trade open and avoid distortions due to protracted ove
ments of real exchange rates. is
Less attention has been given to the fact that the timing and the size mo
of realignments have not fully accommodated divergencies in price and isni
cost behaviour in member countries. From the point of view of the pre
'stability objective' of the System this is very important because it means co
the greater flexibility with which the System has been managed compared ha
with the Bretton Woods regime has not been pushed to the point of losing to
the benefits of a disciplinary exchange rate effect. Pressure to restore cost
andpricecompetitivenessthroughinternaladjustmenthasbeen
maintained.
The third important aspect of the way the System has been managed
N
is that compared with the asymmetrical changes of the Bretton Woods *
systemparity changes have been spread more evenly between weak and
strong currencies. The philosophy expressed by the European Commission
concerning such decisions has been that 'strong currencies should revalue
while weak currencies should adjust'. In the eight realignments that have
occurred so far, the mark and the guilder have been revalued against all
other currencies respectively four and three times.
Finally, in addition to the 'constitutional' and management aspects of
the System, mention must be made of a third. This is the fact that the very
existence of the EMS has significantly deepened the cooperative character
of the policy coordination game among member countries. Procedures for 5
such coordination that had been legislated by the Community well before
1979, were given a new life by the fact that a new commitment had been
aPolicy cooperation and the EMS experience 353
made in the field of exchange rates. The level of representation in the
relevant policy committees, the qulity and openness of the debates held
md in such fora, the readiness of the Commission to 'speak out' and of member




ion The increasing complexity of the management of multicountry economies
requires a greater role for discretionary decisions and a strengthening of
to multilateral institutions. The EMS has been fairly successful so far in
•striking a good balance between 'rules' and 'discretion', absorbing major
external shocks without incurring a disruption inits structure or a
weakening of its commitments. On decisive occasions the System has
the played a crucial role in catalyzing the necessary political will to take the
ays difficult and often unpopular decisions that were required to achieve better
the monetary stability.
• However, this relatively successful experience should not cause us to
gn- overlook the inherent vulnerability of the System in its present setting. That
is the conflict between unrestrained national sovereignty in fiscal and
-size monetary policies, on the one side, and capital mobility and supranational-.
•Lnd ism in trade and exchange rates, on the other. Political and economic
the pressures could cause member countries to choose a non-cooperative
course of action in any moment of the future. Seen in this light, the System
red has not yet achieved the degree of institutional strength that is necessary
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exchange rate variations or their size as from the uncertainty and unpredictability Le
of such changes (see: Bergstrand (1983), Lanyi and Suss (1982)). VEER would
be equal to zero if the exchange rate was a constant or, unlike MAP, if it was Mi
changing at a constant rate; it would be greater than zero if the exchange rate I
oscillatedaround a constant or a trend. This indicator focuses on variability Pa
as it influences the competitiveness of domestic firms and the levels of domestic
prices, wages and activity.
6 The reason for using EV is that it captures a variability that is likely to entail
costs to economic agents but that is not reflected in VEER, which is defined
as the standard deviation of a linear combination of random variables (the
bilateral exchange rates composing the effective exchange rate) that are likely
to be negatively correlated. For example, importers or exporters of a country C
whosecurrency is simultaneously appreciating against one currency and
depreciating against another are facing a costly variability which causes
changes in foreign expenditures and receipts, yet the VEER index remains
stable. Being a measure of variability around trend, EV has the same properties
as VEER. ISS
In calculating VEER and EV we have utilized percentage changes in an
exchange rates rather than deviations from a moving average or a trend, as
because the latter induce an element of arbitrariness and distortions in the
measures. The reasons are indicated by Lanyl and Suss (1982): calculating a
moving average implies an arbitrary decision on the number of elements to be Qi
utilized; in addition a moving average may understate actual exchange rate
changes by smoothing movements too much. Therefore the first order percentage I TI
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uses Padoa Schioppa's paper falls into two parts, one devoted to some
ains quantitative assessment of the EMS, and the other devoted to more general
rties issues of policy co-ordination with special reference to the way these arise,





The kinds of measures which Dr Padoa Schioppa presents us with here
are familiar for this type of problem. In his paper they are brought up to
date, and implemented on daily as well as on monthly data. The basic
procedure is to compare a measure of exchange rate; inflation or monetary
stability across member-EMS countries for the period since the inception
of the system with the value of that measure for the same countries prior
and to the inception of the EMS, and with the behaviour of similar measures
constructed for a control group of non-EMS countries over the same two
md pre- and post-EMS periods. Padoa Schioppa's results confirm those
rch obtained by other authors: for the EMS countries, the EMS period gives
greater stability, and the trend is more favourable than that to be found
no! amongthe control group (where, by and large, volatility has increased).
The same basic result, moreover, tends to come through whichever one
res of a wide variety of statistical definitions of stability, the exchange rate or
the money supply is used (though, perhaps not surprisingly, the coefficient
oaf of variation and the standard deviation give different verdicts on the
convergence of monetary growth rates over a period of general decline).
These exercises, and others like it must be supplied with caveats, of
er- course. A major one is that, rather obviously, the method is only a crude
on and indirect means of measuring the preferred counterfactual 'what would
have happened if the EMS had not been created?'. Necessarily, the results
nd of applying the method can only be a part of an attempt to answer that
question.a
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Second, the stability measures need to be handled with some care. We
would not think it a good idea to have perfect stability of nominal exchange 0th
rateswith fluctuating relative inflation and hence, gyrating real exchange Sifl(
rates. Nor would stability of real exchange rates, if accompanied by sup
extreme but offsetting fluctuations in nominal exchange rates and relative
inflation rates, be particularly desirable. The measures have to be taken the
together, for these reasons. the
Third, it is important to be clear why we attach any value at all to
measures of stability per Se. Arguably, the preferred measure is one of co-(
predictability. Interpreted in this light, the author's measures assume, aco
variously, that the market could be held to have been capable of predicting, not
ex ante the trends revealed ex post, or that the exchange rate is a random
walk. Whilst neither hypothesis is completely unreasonable, such hypoth-
eses are not the outcome of standard exchange rate modelling. An deej
alternative suggestion would be to ask whether forward rates are better by
forecasters of actual rates in the EMS (post-inception) period for member ste
countries than before it and relative to the forecasting performance of md
forward rates in the control group. It would be interesting to see this in
checked out on a similar data base to the one used for the principal the
calculations reported. Batchelor, who performed calculations of this type (
forhis evidence to the House of Lords Committee on the EMS (1983), found the
that forward rate evidence favoured the same conclusion as that arrived tim
at by the means used in the present paper. be1.
Fourth, just to complicate matters, it needs to be said that in any event sen
predictability is not all. In the short run forward markets provide facilities a
for cover, but these markets are very thin for longer horizons and far-seeing gre
capital markets seem equally rare. In this case, being able to predict future cas
exchange rates is not enough. The episode of the overappreciation of fre:
sterling seems to show that many traders understood that the exchange rea
rate would decline in the future but, due to the high fixed cost of re-entry mc
into export markets, found it appropriate to stay in these markets at a
marginal loss in the short term. This perception, it would seem, was not
sharedby the capital market, with the result that firms in this position were
forced to self-finance their far-sightedness by liquidating stocks of goods
andmen on a large scale, or to go out of business. A major benefit of the pri4'
EMS is to have reduced for its members the prospect of an overshooting
exchange rate and experiences of this sort. What is not clear is that the
methods used in the paper wholly capture this benefit, for they are
primarily addressed to the shorter run.
ov
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Since a full verdict on the EMS requires the quantitative assessment to be
supplemented by other kinds of evidence, the author proceeds to supply
some. There is a possibility that, in doing so, he has 'over-rationalized'
the success of the EMS in an understandable desire to see its survival as
the embodiment of the development of a multi-country government
institution pointing the way to a regeneration of international monetary
co-operation and stability of a very desirable kind. That the author's
account may involve such an 'error of sentiment' could be sustained by
noting the following points:
(1) The major institutional innovation of the EMS (at least as it seemed
upon its inception) was the 'divergence indicator'. But this has proven
deeply flawed. Technical flaws in its construction have been amply revealed
by Spaventa (1982) whilst in practice it is clear (a) that the position of
sterling and the lira in relation to the ECU induced a sluggishness in the
indicator and (b) (I would hazard) that had the indicator been triggered
in the 'strong' direction by Germany, it would have had few, if any, of
the consequences supposed of it. Germany would not have accepted them.
(2) The reason for thinking this is related to the second point. Despite
the second oil price shock and other 'noises' the EMS has had an easy
time in its first 5yearsfor a number of highly specific reasons. (i) France
began with and persisted in an attitude —thensomewhat new for her —of
sensitivity to inflation which aligned her more closely with Germany. To
a degree it was true more generally that there was a predisposition to a
greater degree than before to emphasize the control of inflation. (ii) In any
case, those countries who wished it, obtained comparatively considerable
freedom to change parity (Denmark is the obvious example). (iii) For
reasons unconnected with the EMS, the DM was weak against the dollar
most of the time and this dispelled the vision of a 'hard' DM which had
governed the animosity of many critics of the EMS.
(3) It is too easy to forget that only a little over a year ago there were
grave doubts about the ability of France to stay within the EMS.
(4) The durability of the system has, to a degree, been purchased at the
price of a flexibility which some consider tooaccommodating.It has been
described as a 'mere crawling peg', by those who consider this a term of
abuse to suggest that in the compromise of flexibility and rigidity the EMS
has fatally erred on the side of the former.
All these considerations should be borne in mind.Itis easy to
over-rationalize the success of EMS. A final point would be the following:
on a broader political front the foundation of the EMS met the need for
some new creation to fill the gap in the progress of Europe. Another gap—I
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has opened up now. Some people (Roy Jenkins, (1984) for one; but see 3
also Layard et al. (1984)) have advocated that a second phase of the EMS —a
recovery plan, in effect —shouldfill that gap. This poses altogether more
difficult issues than the EMS has so far had to face. But if there is no e
concentration of measures to promote recovery it seems a good bet that
the stresses must show themselves. There is in progress some switch of c
emphasis from control of inflation to reduction of unemployment. This
seems bound to occur, if left to itself, non-uniformly across countries,
producing a scenario for policy divergence.
On would like, of course, to believe that the EMS could rise to this




The author's development of his general themes regarding the actual
historical and future desirable development of multi-country institutions
and decision-making is very appealing. The distinction between rules and L
institutions is obviously useful. The limits of ad hoc cooperation are
usefully and sensibly stressed. This form of decision-making is woefully
expensive in set-up and bargaining costs. The paper also draws out the
difference in developments at the national and international level —atthe
former, away from discretion towards rules, at the latter away from rules.
Few comments seem called for. Below, there follow just two.
(1) Although it is mentioned, the author arguably does not make enough
of the desire of governments to escape the pressure of domestic interest
groups, especially trades unions, in this process. This desire favours the
establishment of rules, such as monetary growth rules, which have the dual 1
purpose of making a commitment to foreign agents and of exposing unions v
to political odium if their actions seem to lead either to a breach of the v
commitment or alternatively to unemployment. As a result of the e
inflationary experiences of the 60s and 70s, this desire to create more room
for governments and less for trades unions became (and remains to some
extent) a significant theme of national policy development. Of course,
generalisation is risky here. The search for rules which serve to isolate trade
union pressure groups and make for confrontation in place of 'consensus'
isa somewhat Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. Monetary rules in some other
countries have, by contrast, emerged as a result of consensus.
(2) Second, for the same reason, governments have been rather disposed
against protectionism. One thing that can certainly be said of free trade
is that it provides protection against sectional producer interests. It is
arguable that too much attention, this last decade and a half, may have is
been diverted to the need to avoid protectionism. The analogy with the irPolicy cooperation and the EMS experience 359
305 was false: then floating rates led to the abuse of undervaluation
a initiatives and attempts to export unemployment. In the 70s and 80s, the
re problem has been rather than countries have accepted or pursued overvalued
exchange rates for the sake of the purchase over inflation thus obtained.
at Relative to the level of unemployment, and its industrial and geographical
of concentration, protectionism has not been a great danger. This situation
Lis could of course now change as the inflation danger is seen to recede, and
that of unemployment to loom larger.
'is
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COMMENT JEFFREY R. SHAFER*
hhe
ial Tommaso Padoa Schioppa has provided a broad-brush review of experience
ns with the European Monetary System, now more than five years old. He
he writes as a close friend of the system, emphasizing positive aspects of the
he experience. In doing so, he covers a lot of ground —frombroad theoretical
m issues of a political nature to some quantitative indications of how
exchange rates and other key economic variables have performed before
and after the establishment of the EMS. I will focus my comments on two
de issues discussed by Padoa Schioppa. One is a rather narrow one —what
is' is the case for discretionary policies? The other involves a range of
er questions about exchange rate volatility.
e
Rules versus discretion de
is One context in which Padoa Schioppa places the development of the EMS
ye is that of the search for a workable balance between rules and discretion
he in international economic policies. The case for discretion does not, in my360 Comment by Jeffrey R. Shafer
view, arise from conflicting objectives as he claims. The essence of
economics is dealing with conflicting objectives —howto make a decision
when one wants more of everything. The economist's approach to such
a problem is to specify an objective function that weights the conflicting
objectives and solve for its maximum, subject to constraints. The set of
solutions corresponding to different inputs imbedded in the constraints is A
a rule. It may be simple or conditional in very complex ways depending en
on how many factors are taken into account. There is not, except in some
gaming situations, any economic logic to introducing indeterminacy. If th
the objectives and constraints can be clearly specified, not following a rule a
only adds noise and inefficiency to the economic environment, be
What, then, is the case for discretion? It is that all of the contingencies th
for a feedback policy may not be anticipated in advance. Discretion
becomes the way in which policies are adjusted in light of contingencies
that often cannot, as a practical matter, be exhaustively spelled out —many
contingencies may be too complex to set out clearly or even to recognize
in advance. The case against discretion has two elements: first, it is too
tolerant of unstructured decisionmaking. And second, it carries an inherent
temptation to pursue time-inconsistent policies, which over the long-haul
erode the credibility and predictability that enhance the economic efficiency
and effectiveness of a policy strategy.
These considerations pro and con are at odds with one another. Hence en
policymakers must seek a balance between discretion and formal, not too ex
complicated rules which balance them. But discretionary acts need to be as
explicable in terms of a broad policy philosophy. I see few situations in th
which there •is an economic, let alone a political, case for capricious ci
policies. c
The EMS seems to represent an attempt to balance these considerations. it:
There are a lot of rules —aboutcentral rates, margins, credits and other h
matters. But they are not intended to be a strait-jacket. Intervention
policies within margins are vague, and central rates can be changed
judgmentally as the outcome of deliberation. Whether the rules are ideal
or the balance of rules and discretion is just right is hard to say. But a rigid
and immutable set of rules of any conceivable degree of complexity would
not avert situations where one would want to set them aside —not
primarily for reasons of time inconsistency but because the rules had not
covered some contingency that arose. On the other hand, I cannot see that
a policy of intervening in exchange markets in amounts and at rates that
were determined day-by-day according to the animal spirits of authorities
would do anything but add noise to international macroeconomic fo
relationships. toPolicy cooperation and the EMS experience 361
of The ideal for policy should be rules, but as a practical matter, prudent




As an outside observer of the EMS, I have reacted much as aeronautical
ng engineers once reacted after studying the bumblebee —Ihave to admit that
•ne it flys, but I don't understand how. Padoa Schioppa gives us some evidence
If that the EMS flys —thatis, that it has reduced exchange rate volatility by
ile a number of measures. He gives some hints as to what might be going on
behind the scenes. But they are not sufficient to answer two questions about
—ies the EMS experiment that seem particularly compelling:
—Whatdoes the experiment tell us about our theories of exchange rate
•ies determination?
—If,in fact, exchange rate variability, however measured, has been
ize reducedwithin the EMS, has that resulted in an improvement in
00 economic welfare? The answer depends on the nature of the exchange
.nt rate fluctuations that were suppressed and on the other consequences
of the means by which this was accomplished.
Before turning to some thoughts on what answering these questions
ice entails, I have a few comments on the evidence presented in the paper that
oo exchange-rates within the EMS member countries have been more stable
be as a result of its establishment. This evidence consists of comparisons of
in the volatility of short-run (that is, daily and monthly) exchange rate
us changes among the EMS currencies before and after its establishment and
comparisons of EMS and non-EMS currency volatility before and after
is. its establishment. The results constitute powerful evidence that the EMS
er has made a difference in reducing the nominal short-run volatility of
)fl exchange rates among participating currencies. A number of technical
issues could be raised about how to interpret the statistics (indeed, the
a! author discusses some of them). But the results seem fairly robust asjudged
id both from the various measures presented in the paper and from similar
id studies done by others. I don't believe it is worth quibbling over just how
ot short-run variability should be measured, given the robust findings.
Ot But I do have some reservations as to whether reducing short-run
at nominal or real exchange variability is a very important achievement, in
at and of itself. Exchange rate fluctuations are unlikely to have large welfare
es costs if they average out over relatively short time periods. Well developed
tic forward markets and other hedging opportunities would seem to reduce
to a low level the potential inhibiting and distorting effects on trade and
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business planning of purely short-run exchange rate uncertainties. Evidence tii
reviewed recently by the IMF tends to confirm this view of the micro effects
of short-run exchange rate fluctuation. I suspect that the architects of the in
EMS were after bigger game in seeking to establish a zone of monetary to
stability in Europe. sh
One thing I think they were looking for was more stable exchange rate
relationships in the medium-term. Large uncertainties over a period in
ranging from six months to several years are difficult, if not impossible, oi
to hedge not only because forward markets are thin or nonexistent but also of
because they involve decisions on investment and business development a
more than specific transactions of known size and timing. It is not clear ac
whether this objective of more stable exchange rates was seen primarily
in real or in nominal terms, and each has some appeal as a proximate sa
objective. I would judge the EMS by both standards, and if it did better de
on either one and no worse on the other I would be prepared to say that
theEMS had achieved what it was intended to do —settingaside the
question of at what cost or to what ultimate benefits beyond that of
creating a more stable price environment for integrated European coin- I
merce. Hence I would find measures of deviations from some baseline —be
it an average level, a PPP rate, a trend, or a model prediction —more to
informative than the volatility of short-run exchange rate changes. I took
a quick look at some charts, and the question is too close to call with to
confidence by eyeball. But I would not be if the EMS passed a b
before-and-after test using this sort of criteria, and I would be extremely
surprised if it did not pass a before-and-after test relative to non-EMS si
currencies. bi
But what of the costs, and what of the benefits? The author finds greater a
convergence of inflation rates and real monetary growth rates among EMS
countries averaged after 1979. The mixed comparisons with other countries a
do not make a completely convincing case that the EMS inflation di
convergence is markedly different from other groups of countries. More-
over, real money supplies are notoriously dangerous indicators of the
stance of monetary policy: because velocity tends to be positively correlated
with expected inflation, it is not unusual to find the realmoneysupply b
decelerating when monetary policy is fueling an acceleration of inflation. re
The question of the contribution of the EMS to convergence must be
considered as still open. frt
The paper offers some tantalizing hints on how exchange rates have been
kept in line to the extent that they have been. But we need to know more W
to evaluate the benefits of the System. Has the existence of central rates gr
and sterilized intervention activities reduced noise in exchange markets — m
noise which otherwise might have been associated with unstable expecta-
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tions?And has this been achieved without any change in fundamental
cc macroeconomic policies? That is to say, has the EMS been a cheap lunch
in that there has been little need to subordinate domestic policy instruments
r to its operation? If so, has this stabilization of expectations reduced only
short-run volatility or has the reduction of noise had a stabilizing effect
tte over the medium-term? My own reading of the evidence on exchange
market efficiency and on the small percentage of exchange rate changes
Ic over the medium-term that seem systematically explainable on the basis
of fundamentals (even ex-post), leave me disposed to believe that there is
nt a potential for sterilized intervention that is coordinated and undertaken
ar according to a well-understood set of principles to reduce exchange rate
ily volatility. Excess noise in the system might well be reduced without
ite sacrificing domestic policy objectives. The benefits would be better micro-
ter decisionmaking and less aggravation of vicious and virtuous cycles. But
iat we have, as yet, no evidence that the EMS has achieved this.
he Padoa Schioppa suggests that the EMS has been held together by more
of coordination of monetary policy than meets the eye —the'unwritten rules'.
I take this to mean, in analytical terms, that intervention has not been fully
be sterilized, whether this was the direct result of the way intervention was
're technically executed or the result of keying of domestic monetary policy
operations to EMS exchange rate obligations. For starters, it would be nice
th to know the facts. What does the record have to say about correlations
• a between EMS intervention and changes in central bank assets net of
non-monetary liabilities? If there is a correlation, is it only apparent in the
is short-run or over longer periods as well? How symmetrical isthe
behaviour between large and small countries? Between weak currencies
er and strong currencies?
[5 If the evidence suggested that central banks' balance sheets expanded
es and contracted in response to pressures on their currencies within the EMS,
different interpretations could still be offered. For a broad spectrum of
e- open-economy macro-economists who are skeptical of the power of
sterilized exchange market intervention, such evidence would make sense
of a finding of reduced exchange rate volatility it could
be attributed to monetary policy reactions. But would such a reduction
represent an improvement in welfare? The answer would depend on where
the disturbances that led to larger exchange rate fluctuations were coming
from before the EMS was established and on this there would be many
priors within the spectrum. A fundamentalist monetarist economist —one
who believed in the absolute stability of velocity —wouldexpect to see
greater stability of exchange rates only as a result of more stable relative
— moneygrowth rates. Perhaps this would be a good thing, but not
necessarily if it came at a cost of more unstable money growth for EMS364 Comment by Jeffrey R. Shafer
countries taken together. In the middle ground, fallen away monetarists
and lapsed Keynesians, who saw money demand as the central determinant h
of nominal income but also as subject to unpredictable shocks, would
expect to see more volatility of money growth as exchange rate pressures
signalled central banks to adjust money supplies in response to money
N demand disturbances. This volatility might well be associated both with
greater exchange rate stability and with more stable economic conditions
domestically. Once again, however, macroeconomic stability within the
EMS bloc would depend on success in offsetting, rather than exacerbating,
aggregate money demand disturbances in the bloc. Reducing relative
disturbances between participants would not be sufficient.
A third group in the spectrum, comprised of those who see floating
exchange rates as a source of additional noisein macroeconomic
relationships —andIsuspect this was a prevailing view among the
architects of the EMS —oughtto view greater money supply volatility in
response to exchange market pressures with some misgiving. Greater
exchange rate stability would then have been purchased at a cost of more
unstable domestic monetary conditions. It would no longer be clear that
it was worth it in strictly economic terms.
This leads me to the more fundamental agenda behind the EMS. It was
established, in part, as a gesture to restore momentum towards greater
political and economic unification in the community. If it were successful
in this respect, it would be hard to fault the EMS; whether or not it made
a large direct contribution to macroeconomic stability. But in this respect,
the EMS has not provided as visible an impetus as one might have hoped.
The commitment made at the time of its establishment, to take further steps
towards monetary integration in Europe, has apparently been set aside.
From the outside, it seems that as time has passed it has become more
difficult —bothpolitically and economically —tochange central rates.
Padoa Schioppa argues that this is because those decisions are becoming
more collaborative, but this is a charitable view. Moreover, the system is
held together, in part, with capital controls and even intra-EEC trade
restrictions. Finally, onr 'arge member of the Community remains outside
the exchange rate arrangements. These tensions may be as much a threat
to European integration as more volatile exchange rates would be.
The book on the EMS is not finished yet.I have indicated some
economic questions that seem answerable now. And it is important to
answer them —notjust from the standpoint of evaluating the EMS but for
uqderstanding better how alternatives to the present exchange rate
arrangements among major currencies and blocs of currencies might
function. However, the answer to the most important question, whether
external monetary arrangements can contribute to closer economic andPolicy cooperation and the EMS experience 365
politicalintegration in Europe, will remain open for some time. I, for one,






*Theviews expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those
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